copy. This is the so-called "engrossed copy." If the engrossed bill passes the House, it is signed by the Clerk of the House and forwarded to the Senate. 3 If the engrossed bill passes the Senate, it is signed by the Secretary of the Senate and forwarded to the House. 4 The Clerk or Secretary's signature at this stage is a mere formality: it indicates to the sister-house that passage by the originating house is now complete and that the receiving house may now act on the bill. Barring complications, once the sister-house passes the bill in identical form, a new copy of the bill is produced. 5 This is the so-called "enrolled copy." 6 The presiding officers of the two Houses, the Vice President for the Senate and the Speaker for the House, sign the enrolled bill. 7 The Supreme Court has cle I of the Constitution. The fact that this statute creates duties for congressional staffers does not imply that a bill, otherwise meeting the requirements of Article I, is rendered invalid or ineffective because the technical requirements of engrossment or enrollment were lacking. Furthermore, the fact that the requirements of this statute can be waived by a concurrent resolution-a resolution which is not presented to the President-indicates that this statute only controls an internal or organizational matter of the two houses, and it does not control the legal relations of the Congress vis-à-vis non-members or the other branches of government. See, e.g., United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517 (1998):
The Constitution sets forth the only manner in which the Members of Congress have the power to impose their will upon the country: by a bill that passes both Houses and is either signed by the President or repassed by a supermajority after his veto.
Art. I, § 7. Everything else the Members of Congress do is either prelude [to acting on a bill] or internal organization [of the Congress].
Id. at 535-36 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
3 See 1 U.S.C. § 106 (2002). 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 Id.; see also JOHNSON, supra note 1 (describing enrollment); Dove, supra note 1 (discussing preparation of enrolled copy).
7 See 1 U.S.C. § 106; see also Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892):
The signing by the speaker of the house of representatives, and by the president of the senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the president, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. . . . The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the act so authenticated, is in conformity with the constitution. 4 (1990) , the Court noted that although a challenge to the content of a billenacted-into-a-law cannot be based upon Congress' journals, per Field, a justiciable challenge is presented where "a constitutional provision is implicated." Even accepting Professor held that the presence of these signatures is conclusive evidence of congressional compliance with constitutionally mandated bicameral passage. 8 On the other hand, if a bill is passed by one house, and forwarded to the sister-house, but the sister-house refrains from acting on the bill, then it is widely believed that final adjournment kills the bill. 9 To put it another way, the prevailing opinion is that, in order to turn a bill into a law, Amar's position as to the current purportedly limited reach of the Field holding, those objecting to noncontemporaneous House-Senate action can point to no "constitutional provision" mandating contemporaneity. In any event, a federal district court has rejected Professor Amar's reading of Oct. 29, 2006) . In other Commonwealth jurisdictions, prorogation only quashes items "pending" on a legislative house's agenda paper-i.e., the government's agenda. Finalized items, no longer on the agenda, and in possession of a sister institution, i.e., another house or the Governor-General, may or may not be quashed, depending on local law. It seems to me that, in exercising a legislative power as part of the General Assembly, it is a matter of grave doubt as to whether such legislative power can be exercised by any component part at a time other than when there is in existence a General Assembly consisting of the three component parts. Apparently, the United States Supreme Court and other persuasive authority believe otherwise. See supra note 9 (quoting Edwards v. U.S.); see also infra notes 19-22. is ironic that those identified with the left are so quick to denounce Meese's speech, for that denunciation further legitimizes government by legally trained elites, speaking an evermore esoteric language. It is of a piece with the left's lusty opposition to the prospect of a constitutional convention.").
14 But see 1 U.S.C. § 106 (2002) (explaining that the enrolled copy is produced after bicameral passage). 15 Similarly, just as Majority Leader Frist (or his successor) might pass bills in the 110th Senate acted upon by the 109th House, the lame-duck session of the 109th House might attempt to pass bills sent to the House by the 108th (or some prior) Senate. However, this latter case is more problematic because the engrossed copies of Senate bills that have already been sent to the House do not bear the signature of the Vice President of the United States. Of course, in this event, one might ask Vice President Cheney, the current office holder, to sign the enrolled bill on behalf of the prior Senate which has already fully acted on the bill (i.e., the traditional three readings). I do not opine on the legality or validity of a current Vice President signing, without specific authorization from the full Senate, an enrolled or engrossed bill passed by a prior Senate from a period of time in which he was not the Vice President of the United States. Professor Ackerman has categorically stated that the proposed procedure is unconstitutional. See Ackerman, Impeachment Inquiry Testimony supra note 9 (emphasis added):
As a constitutional matter, the House of Representatives is not a continuing body. When the 105th House dies on January 3rd, all its unfinished business dies with it.
To begin with the most obvious example, a bill passed by the 105th House that is still pending in the 105th Senate on January 3rd cannot be enacted into law unless it once again is approved by the Senate will have no opportunity to amend your handiwork because the newly elected incoming Democratic House majority will not concur either in the original bill or in its amendments. But if the Senate does not insist upon amendments, this process will allow you to govern without help from: (i) the incoming Democratic Speaker or House leadership; (ii) the newly elected Democratic House majority; or (iii) coalitions including any Democratic House members. Anyway, you are probably wondering if the newly elected Democratic House majority could frustrate your efforts and if there is any legal support for this course of action. The first question is easy. The new House majority could do nothing, except perhaps sue to block enforcement of the new "law," assuming ultimate Senate passage. Additionally, it is likely that House Democrats will demand that the Senate return the "wrongly" enrolled bills. The House, however, cannot force the Senate's hand. As a matter of comity, the Senate might choose to comply, but it is not obligated to comply. 16 Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that a A legal academic's first responsibility is to know and to report what has gone before. It may be that Professor Ackerman has adopted the "continuing body" refrain because it has been used, on occasion, by the federal courts. My own view is that constitutional law as a discipline would gain enormously if its participants would eschew terms of art, like "continuing body"-a term that lacks any serious intellectual content, in favor of plain words. I have always thought that, as your Constitution has no prorogation or dissolution, and as both of your Houses are continuing bodies (notwithstanding that all of the House seats turn over at the same time), it makes little sense to speak of different congresses, sessions or terms, and the convention of bills dying at the end of a "term" also has no basis. It is true that our courts have adopted this neologism, but, perhaps, they ought to be put right? Cf. 17 This takes me to the second question, as to legal support. Yes, there is some legal authority in support of our position. First, state ratification of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, the most recent amendment to the Constitution, concluded well after it was initially proposed-by the First Congress, more than two hundred years earlier! So we know that with regard to lawmaking through constitutional amendments, there is no re- House impeachment, Senate conviction, Senate action on treaties, Senate action on appointments, specified internal matters, and contingency elections for the President and Vice President); see also United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 535-36 (1998). But see Tillman, supra note 11, at 1322 (arguing that the purpose of the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause was to permit a prior statute to authorize a legally enforceable subsequent singlehouse order subject to presidential veto and possible veto override by Congress). quirement that the conclusion of the state ratification process be even roughly contemporaneous with prior bicameral congressional action. 18 Second, there is also no requirement for contemporaneous action in lawmaking by treaties. The President submits a proposed treaty to the Senate and if the Senate gives its advice and consent, the President ratifies the treaty. The President is not required by the express text of the Constitution to act within the two-year term of the Senate granting its advice and consent. And presidents have exercised this authority. 19 Third, and more importantly, with regard to the process by which a bill becomes a law, the Supreme Court has held that a President may sign a bill after the final adjournment of Congress, and some Presidents have actually done so. 20 
.") (emphasis added). No constitutional provision expressly precludes an enacting
Congress from delaying presentment, thereby bypassing the President then in office, in favor of some next-in-time successor in office. (Indeed, were presentment made in the last ten days of an outgoing administration, both the outgoing and incoming President would be left with less than ten days to make a veto decision-because the two Presidents would have a total of ten days between them-thus congressional delay in these circumstances is not manipulative, but is, instead, best legislative practice). Contemporary legal scholars have taken a contrary position: requiring presidential signatures and vetoes of bills to be contemporaneous with congressional action, without citing any supporting authority and offering little, if any, policy justification. Compare supra note 9 (citing Professors Michael Stokes Paulsen, Catherine It appears that where the President is presented with a bill passed in a prior Congress, his inaction results in a pocket veto. The basis of this view seems to be that the bill cannot be returned to the enacting Congress (or, at least the enacting House), notwithstanding that the successor Congress is in session. My own view is that, in these circumstances, presidential inaction constitutes valid passage if Congress is in session on the tenth day following presentment. Why? Because that is what the Constitution says. Although allowing for these pocket vetoes lends some counter-authority to the position argued for in the text of this memorandum, I see no good reason to believe that the postbellum Congress of 1871 was any better situated than we are today to understand the meaning of Article I, Section 7. Furthermore, were originalists to argue that noncontemporaneous bicameral action was beyond the scope of the 1787 legal and parliamentary imagination, with the implication that such processes were beyond the realm of possible original public meaning, they might not be on very firm ground. Compare NEW YORK CONSTITUTION OF 1777 art. III (mandating that if adjournment frustrates return of vetoed bill, then it "shall be returned on the first day of the meeting of the legislature after the expiration of the said ten days"), with SYDNEY GEORGE FISHER, THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 161-67 (Philadelphia 1897) (arguing that the origin of Article I, Section 7 is to be found in the New York Constitution of 1777 and the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780). For what it is worth, the Supreme Court of India, has held: had assembled, although always acting within ten days of presentment. Thus we know that lawmaking by Presidential authority need not be contemporaneous with the "enacting" Congress. 23 Also, as I indicated above, the Supreme Court has held that the signatures of the Speaker and Vice President are conclusive evidence binding on the federal courts that Congress has validly exercised legislative authority in accord with the constitutionally mandated bicameralism requirement. 24 In short, with regard to each and every head of federal lawmakingconstitutional amendments, treaties, and statutes-there is simply no express requirement for contemporaneous action among the relevant institutions and where closely related questions have actually been addressed by the courts or by practice, the evidence leans against contemporaneity.
There is one significant legal argument against this plan: it has never been done before. 25 Indeed, to many judges, a long-enduring legal custom may have the force of constitutional law. 26 This simplistic view is mistaken. The better view is that history only ratifies one of a number of ambiguous meanings of a constitutional provision, if the asserted meaning was actually contested and the non-prevailing institution acquiesced or otherwise adopted the practice. 27 In this case, Congress has never asserted the authority to act noncontemporaneously. Still, in these 24 See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672 (1892). 25 Once you practice noncontemporaneous lawmaking, then an outgoing Democratic majority, in either house (or at the state level), could try it too. But until the Democrats take back the Oval Office, this gambit will present them with little opportunity for genuine success. Congressional "passage" will be followed (one hopes) with a firm presidential veto. 26 See, e.g., The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929) (taking the position that "[l]ong settled and established practice is a consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions of this character"). 27 Noncontemporaneous lawmaking powers, if asserted by Congress, could be defended as a matter of principle and distinguished from the interpretive principles put forward by the Supreme Court in The Pocket Veto Case. See supra note 26. Here, the attempt is to revivify (actually just to "vivify") an unused, but never contested, constitutional power. Many never used but undoubted constitutional powers exist including, for example, the right of the States to call a constitutional convention under Article V. Moreover, in the face of ambiguous constitutional text, Executive and Judicial Branch claims to power or usurpation of authority should only influence future adjudications if followed by legislative acquiescence in response to the other branch's actions:
[A] practice of at least twenty years duration, on the part of the executive department, acquiesced in by the legislative department, while not absolutely binding on the judicial department, is entitled to great regard in determining the true construction of a constitutional provision the phraseology of which is in any respect of doubtful meaning. circumstances, as you might expect (from a cautious lawyer), I cannot guarantee how the courts will ultimately rule. Of course, I also do not opine on the political ramifications to taking the suggested course of action. Whether it animates your base or enrages the country is a matter for your particular expertise.
Sincerely, John Smith, Esq. Senior House Legal Counsel HOW DID WE GET HERE?
In the United Kingdom, royal assent to a bill is only granted during the life of the enacting Parliament. Once Parliament is dissolved by proclamation or expiry of time-its prior legislative acts and votes, including all bills not fully enacted or not having received royal assent, are a legal nullity. Put simply, they die. This has been the tradition from time immemorial to the present day. 28 Lawmaking requires unity in time, in place, and among all actors: Queen, Lords, and Commons.
But in the colonies, separated by distance and time from the monarch, the process created for enacting statutes took a somewhat different path from that of the mother country. Royal assent would not (customarily) be granted by the actual person of the monarch. The monarch acted through representatives, such as royal governors, lieutenant-governors, and governors-general. But it would sometimes happen that a monarch's representative was unable, unwilling, or unsure how to proceed on a bill. For this eventuality, the British created a modified process for their colonies. Royal assent on a bill could be delayed until the bill was sent to the monarch-even if the reality was (and is) that the monarch acted on the advice of ministers. Thus, the colonial lawmaking process allowed for delayed royal assent: delayed in the sense that assent might follow the legal dissolution of the local (sovereign) parliament (the American view) or the local (subordinate) assembly (the British view) proposing a bill. Were it otherwise, the life of such assemblies would have to be continu- ally extended, a process fraught with inconvenience for the members and substantial costs for ratepayers paying representatives per diem or even a salary. 29 The colonial assemblies avoided this result by positive law- 29 In the early years of the Republic, Western States and territories frequently had a single Article III judge or magistrate. If this federal judicial officer became incapacitated or died, then a quick replacement was essential in order to meet defendants' speedy trial rights. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing speedy trial rights and ratified in 1791, after the Constitution of 1787 was proposed, ratified, and put into force in 1789). Absent Executive Branch judicial recess appointments, the only way to fill these offices would have been to convene the Senate. And if the Senators from well-settled States knew their presence was demanded only to fill a single unexpectedly vacant judicial position in some remote territory (or distant State), is it reasonable to believe that reaching a quorum was a foregone conclusion? Members' convenience and ratepayers' salary obligations were no idle concern. Cf., e.g., U.S. CONST. Many articles on the subject of recess appointments object to the President's (purported) power to make appointments during (relatively) short intra-session breaks. These breaks are properly denominated adjournments, but are frequently denominated recesses, leading to substantial confusion. The fundamental source of the confusion is that both domestic judicial opinions and scholarly literature assume that the distinction, between recess and adjournment, is rooted in the amount of time involved-rather than the functional quality of the different type of break takes with regard to sessional business. The chief objection to intra-session appointments is rooted in the belief that such appointments, even absent Senate consent, must last nearly as long as two years-the remainder of the current annual session (following the adjournment), plus the entirety of the next annual session. This view is profoundly mistaken. Any such two-year appointment carries implicit Senate confirmation. If the majority actually opposes the appointment, upon reconvening following adjournment, the Senate could declare by single-house resolution the start of a new session and order the Secretary of the Senate to enter an appropriate entry on its journal-with concomitant notification by message to the President and the House. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 ("Each House shall keep a Journal . . . ."). The Senate's declaration of the start of a new session would effect all presidential recess appointments made during the prior intrasession adjournment: the term of every such appointment would end with the expiration of the remainder of the current (annual) session. And were the Senate to immediately terminate (by order) that (newly announced) session, all recess appointees' term of service would end. If any presidential recess appointment lasts more than a year (or even a year), it is by the grace of the United States Senate. I do not opine on the constitutional propriety of intra-session appointments per se. My comments are put forward only to illustrate the invalidity of the twoyear objection frequently propounded in the scholarly literature. The Senate has substantial powers and prerogatives from which it may actively defend its role in the appointments process, if it chooses to avail itself of those defenses. That said, there is absolutely no compelling reason for the federal courts to (once again) play the constitutional cavalry coming to the (oppressed) Senate's rescue, unless and until the Senate makes use of the full set of powers at its undoubted disposal. Positive law, however, is a creature of words. Words meant to accomplish one thing might not, on their face, precisely mirror the norms and practices that they were designed to mimic or depart from. 30 Bicameralism was built into the Constitution of 1787, apparently with allowances for the executive to act during or beyond the termination of a two-year House. But in doing so, the drafters did not include any actual language in the Constitution mandating that prior to sending the bill to the President, a concurrent House and Senate had to effect passage.
That American statutory lawmaking 31 has been bicamerally contemporaneous has nothing to do with the Constitution. Rather, our legisla-tive practice arises from the fortuity of the rules passed by the First Congress. Each house of the First Congress passed a rule requiring authentication of bills by its presiding officer, Speaker and the Vice President, 32 following joint passage. 33 Authentication was a joint activity (following bicameral passage), not a sequential one (following passage in the first house, but prior to passage in the sister-house). So if only one house fully enacted a bill before the termination of a two-year Congress, there was no evidence 34 34 Arguably, every time a bill passes one house by a majority, there is some evidence of final single-house action. The evidence is the journal entry noting final passage. This is weak evidence of passage. The understanding that a final vote of a house is coextensive with Article I, Section 7, Clause 2's bill passage requirements is rooted in the widespread misunderstanding that authentication by a presiding officer is a ministerial action. No judicially cognizable constitutional provision or statute obligates a presiding officer of either house of Congress to authenticate following majority action on third reading, although this is the majority's expectation. Cf. MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 20 ("Any presiding officer refusing to sign a bill passed by both houses shall thereafter be disqualified from any office of honor or profit in the state."). Were a presiding officer to refuse to authenticate, the majority's recourse is not the courts, but to appoint a new presiding officer, with notification of their new selection to the other house and to the President. A house that dissolves prior to authentication risks strategic action by an out-going presiding officer. It is for that reason that well-organized legislative majorities demand authentication during the session-where the majority could still enforce its will against a recalcitrant (or insane) presiding officer. Post-adjournment and post-dissolution authentication comes with other attendant, but less noticed, risks: death, (constructive or actual) resignation, and arrest of the presiding officer. All these scenarios could frustrate the majority's will. (1990) (holding that "courts accept as passed all bills authenticated in the manner provided by Congress"). The better view is that final single-house action prior to authentication is likened to an offer to the sister-house, with the offer contingent on joint passage during that two-year Congress. Furthermore, although an offer has been made, implicit in such an offer is the right to rescind prior to actual authentication by the presiding officer. Consider this scenario: the House passes a bill, the Senate passes the same bill and notifies the House, the House changes its minds and directs its Speaker not to authenticate the bill. 
